Until the mid-2000s – and in many quarters, even today – tactical flexibility in a team was derided by fans and the media in England as a form of weakness. A traditional 4-4-2, without much variety at all, had been the cultural coda since Charles Hughes’ FA coaching policy was written. There is also a societal antipathy directed toward the tinkerer in this country (he is confused, without knowledge of his best XI etc) whereas in, say, Italy if a manger’s tactical scheme changes in relation to the opponents he faces, he is seen as looking for solutions. Being reactive isn’t as weak an ideal as many deem it where football is concerned.
“We [English footballers and coaches] do not think about tactics…The 4-4-2 is the easiest formation to play if you’re poor technically and we’ve never been the best in terms of technique.” –David Platt
Platt’s point is not unfounded; tactical flexibility is contingent on technical mastery. Why 4-4-2 became the prescribed approach to our game is not the question at hand but it is interesting to wonder: historically, do we play 4-4-2 because we don’t have the players? Or do we not have the players because we play 4-4-2?
It’s obvious to note that English dominance in the Champions League over the past 5 or 6 years has been without the 4-4-2. Liverpool, Chelsea, Manchester United, and Arsenal have all made it to the semi-finals or more and none have employed the traditional 4-4-2. The reason for this is simple; European football demands tactical flexibility and other teams, particularly the Italians, have been clinically adept in the past at dismantling the formation. Ferguson talks openly about the discipline and flexibility he desired in Europe, especially after losing to Marcelo Lippi’s Juventus:
“I remember playing Juve in the mid-1990s…We get a throw-in near the corner flag. Gary Neville takes the throw and Alen Boksic goes up the other end and scores…That was it, one-nil and that was all they needed. We learned from that…Italians don’t get caught on counter attacks like that. We had to learn to do the same.”
Arsene Wenger is a believer of the 4-4-2 not due to any romantic notions of English tradition but because of its efficient coverage of space on the football pitch:
“I think it’s the most rational formation in most cases. With a 4-4-2, sixty per cent of your players are covering sixty per cent of the pitch. No other formation is as efficient at covering space.”
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However it is also interesting to note that Arsenal’s early decade feats were achieved using a nominal 4-4-2, meaning there were nuances to their patterns of play with the two forwards rarely occupying the traditional positions (often leaving no obvious focal point to the attack). Henry would tend to move toward the left into space and Bergkamp dropped deep. Henry’s movement allowed Pires space inside and the opposition were positionally unsure how to tackle the fluid change and thus overwhelmed. Arsenal used the foundation of a 4-4-2 but their variety in execution meant they were doubly effective at combating the traditional version of the formation that most of the league would turn out against them, as Ferguson explains:
“Arsenal have done very well against the 4-4-2. Henry doesn’t play through the middle, he goes into space, and Bergkamp drops off. If the opposing right back goes forward, Henry goes into the space behind him and Pires cuts inside. That works very well…That’s why some teams are starting to change…for example; we always keep the right back position filled when we play them. Henry needs space to play. If you give it to him he destroys you, but if you deny him space you’ve got a chance.”
Ferguson alludes to two interesting points; the first is specific tactical changes implemented to accommodate the threat of a particular team (something he is certainly not given enough credit for as a manager), and the second is the success that the top teams had against the rest of the league due to their own flexibility and everyone else’s unwillingness to change. The rest of the league would, almost undoubtedly, opt for a rigid 4-4-2. The only variation may have been 4-5-1 but even this was rudimentary – changing one forward for one ball winning midfielder. The top teams weren’t the best only because of personnel. I know many are thinking it’s easy to do well when you have Bergkamp and Henry (this is completely true) but, equally, not being flexible in your approach to stopping these players is an indictment on the depth of tactical knowledge in the league at the time.
The consistent top performers in the last six years or so have achieved domestic success due to their ability at nullifying traditional 4-4-2 formations offered by the rest of the league. Mourinho had top class players at Chelsea, no one doubts that, but the sheer mechanised demolition of the opposition in their back-to-back title run is as much down to the tactics employed as it is the players at his disposal:
“The English are always thinking in the same way,” said Mourinho, “But the top teams are not playing a pure 4-4-2 and this is a problem for the others because their football is based on stopping pure 4-4-2. If I have a triangle in midfield…I will always have an advantage against a pure 4-4-2 where the midfielders are side by side.”
His Chelsea team highlighted, excruciatingly, the shortcomings of the traditional English formation. Makelele would work between the lines and have time and space. If he was closed down, one of the two central midfielders would be free. If they too were closed down, the wingers would come inside and help leaving space on the flanks for either the full backs to bomb down or the wingers to attack themselves. It was painfully methodical. And as Mourinho points out:
“There is nothing a pure 4-4-2 can do to stop this. That’s why I think it’s popularity will come to an end in England. It has to. It does not work against teams like us.”
Mourinho, Benitez, Ferguson and Wenger have all tweaked their teams and their preferred formations since. Football tactics remains a constantly evolving spectrum, probably most influenced by the players at your disposal instead of a predetermined ideal, but it is glaringly obvious to see that, without the traditional 4-4-2, English teams have enjoyed more consistent success in Europe. It will certainly be interesting to see how Tottenham fair in the Champions League in the coming season and whether Redknapp decides to slightly change his tactics, especially away from home, to counter the better European teams.
Sources:
The Italian Job, Gianluca Vialli & Gabriele Marcotti
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